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BOSWELL. “You say, Dr. Johnson, that Garrick exhibits himself for
a shilling. In this respect he is only on a footing with a lawyer who
exhibits himself for his fee, and even will maintain any nonsense
or absurdity, if the case requires it. Garrick refuses a play or a
part which he does not like; a lawyer never refuses.” JOHNSON.
“Why, Sir, what does this prove? [O]nly that a lawyer is worse.”1

How can lawyers help criminal defendants they know to be guilty
avoid conviction and punishment? In Contextualist Answers to Skepticism, and What A Lawyer Cannot Know,2 Professor William Edmundson3 answers that nagging question, a question asked not only
at cocktail parties, but also in law faculty lounges and legal ethics
classes. Prof. Edmundson’s answer is clever, even brilliant, and appealing, almost seductive. It is also, I am afraid, fundamentally
flawed. But it is flawed in deeply interesting and revealing ways. In
Part I of this Comment, I try to show why both Prof. Edmundson’s
question and his answer are more important than he himself suggests. In Part II, I try, at greater length, to isolate what I believe to
be his answer’s fundamental flaw. Finally, in Part III, I suggest why
Prof. Edmundson’s answer, flawed though I think it is, may mark an

* Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell Professor of Law, Florida State University. I am grateful to William Edmundson, Stephanie Gamble, Mark Seidenfeld, and
Donald Weidner for their comments and encouragement and to Chenell Garrido and
Román Ortega-Cowan for their diligent and capable research assistance. Special thanks to
Mary McCormick, Senior Research Librarian, Florida State University College of Law—
our ultimate source for all obscure citations. I thank the Florida State University College
of Law for providing a research grant and leave for the summer of 2002.
1. JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 213 (1952).
2. 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2002).
3. Following prevailing convention, I will refer to my interlocutor as “Prof. Edmundson” or, for brevity’s sake, simply “Edmundson.” Those usages belie, however, the fact that
he and I are on a friendly, familiar, and first-name basis; he was my most gracious host on
a visit several years ago to his home institution, Georgia State University, and I his on his
visit to Tallahassee last fall for the presentation of his Contextualist Answers paper to the
law faculty at Florida State University. Thank you, Bill, for making that presentation and
for publishing your piece in the pages of our Law Review.
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important realization in legal ethics scholarship, underscoring the
need for significant new work in several related directions.
I. INTRODUCTION: PROF. EDMUNDSON’S CONTEXTUALISM IN
CONTEXT, OR THE STRANGE CAREER OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE
PARADIGM
The question Prof. Edmundson addresses in his paper, big though
it is in its own right, is actually a particularization of an even bigger
question: “Can a good person be a good lawyer?” If Prof. Edmundson’s question is the most basic in criminal defense lawyering,4 this
latter is, by general consensus, central to legal ethics as a whole.5 To
fully appreciate the importance of Prof. Edmundson’s question, we
need to see how closely it has come to be related to the other, broader
question.
Not surprisingly, all legal ethicists and practicing lawyers answer
the “can a good person be a good lawyer” question in the affirmative;
no more surprisingly, as a legal ethicist and former lawyer, I am convinced we are right. Where we differ is not on whether a good person
can be a good lawyer, but on how. Here we divide logically, but by no
means numerically, in half. On the one hand are those who believe
that the good person, as a good lawyer, may (more strongly, should)
do all that the letter of the law allows for any client. Call them the
neutral partisans.6 On the other hand are those, myself and Edmundson both included, who believe that other normative limits,
sometimes narrower than the letter of the law, govern what the good
person, as good lawyer, may do for at least some clients, at least

4. See JAMES S. KUNEN, HOW CAN YOU DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE? THE MAKING OF A
CRIMINAL LAWYER (1983); Barbara A. Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
175 (1983-84).
5. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral
Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
613, 614; Gerald J. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, in THE
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 286, 287 (David Luban ed., 1984)
[hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER]; see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 109 (1988)
[hereinafter LAWYERS & JUSTICE]; Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad Person?,
84 MICH. L. REV. 1011 (1986) (reviewing THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, and STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984)); cf. THOMAS L.
SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 32 (1981) (“Is it possible to be a Christian
and a lawyer?”); Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer’s Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1148 (1990). But cf. Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
551, 560 (1991) (“To ask whether one can be both a good person and a good lawyer is to ask
the wrong question.”).
6. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589,
605 (1985); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36-38.
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some of the time.7 Call us the critics of neutral partisanship or, more
positively, the reformers.8
The central question of legal ethics arises as a practical matter
because lawyers are sometimes asked or required, in their role as
lawyers, to do things that strike all conscientious people, lawyers and
non-lawyers alike, as morally suspect. These apparent conflicts between what theorists call role morality and ordinary morality9 include, to put it in classical terms, making the true look false and the
false, true. Discrediting truthful witnesses is an example of the former; arguing for factual or legal positions in which you don’t believe
nicely illustrates the latter.10
For all their disagreement on these matters, legal ethicists have
tended to agree on one context where what we have called neutral
partisanship, or something very close to it, should be practiced.11
That context is criminal defense. In what has come to be called the
criminal defense paradigm,12 the way to be a good person and a good
lawyer is to do all that the law allows to acquit your clients, even clients whom you know to be guilty, dangerous, and unrepentant. Some
have argued that this should include assisting the client in presenting perjured testimony.13 Although neither the law nor many legal
scholars go quite this far, both the law and virtually all commentators agree that the criminal defense lawyer has, to quote the oft-

7. This second group is actually and theoretically divisible into two subgroups, those
who believe that the extra-legal, supplemental norms are public, accessible to and binding
upon all lawyers, and those who believe otherwise. The latter tend to invoke norms from
particular religious traditions, though non-public norms can be, and occasionally are, imported from secular systems as well. For present purposes, however, we can safely ignore
these subclasses; for more (much, much more) on why they matter, see Rob Atkinson, A
Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 269 (1995)
and Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality, 51 MD. L. REV. 853, 883 (1992).
8. There is no generally accepted, universally used, term for neutral partisanship’s
opponents. I choose “reformers” because it implies, almost literally, that neutral partisanship is a departure from an earlier, more desirable position, contrary to the suggestion that
neutral partisanship has any logical or historical, much less normative, priority. Furthermore, for those versed in theology, the term reformer has additional resonances, for me
quite strongly positive.
9. For perhaps the clearest elaboration of this distinction in the context of legal ethics, see LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 104-27.
10. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS
171 (1998) (giving these examples in the context of criminal defense).
11. See id. at 170, 237 n.1 (noting that “[s]ome people who join me in rejecting the
Dominant View [neutral partisanship] make an exception for criminal defense,” and citing
the work of fellow reformers David Luban, Richard Wasserstrom, and Deborah Rhode).
12. LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 65.
13. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 119-20 (1990) (arguing that criminal defense counsel should be allowed to present perjury testimony just as
they present other testimony).
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quoted language of Justice Byron White, “a different mission.”14
Just how different that mission is, however, is a point of considerable disagreement between neutral partisans and their critics. Curiously, each school tends to minimize the “difference” of the criminal
defense paradigm, but in opposite directions. Reformers try to move
the criminal defense paradigm toward all other lawyering, which, for
them, involves checking lawyerly advocacy with supplemental
norms;15 neutral partisans try to move all lawyering in the direction
of the criminal defense paradigm, which, for them, involves pressing
any client’s advantage to the fullest extent of the letter of the law.16
All lawyers, according to neutral partisans, should be as unalloyedly loyal to all clients, in all causes, as criminal defense lawyers
are to those charged with the severest of crimes. Reformers have responded to this position in two related ways. First, and with greatest
accord, they have tried to distinguish the need for extraordinary zeal
in criminal defense from the kind of client loyalty appropriate in
other contexts.17 This has been a careful, even judicious, process. In
the initial phase, critics of neutral partisanship showed how routine,
non-adversarial, in-office counseling differs from all litigation, not
just criminal defense, in ways that make the injection of publicspirited advice desirable, even essential, to the proper lawyerly role.18
Next, they pointed that, in some civil litigation contexts, the criminal
defense tables are effectively turned, from individual Davids defending against the Goliath state to corporate Goliaths like Kerr-McGee
going after individual Davids like Karen Silkwood.19 Finally, they
argued that, even when private clients are civil defendants, the similarities to criminal defense may be more diagramatic than real. This
is particularly true, they point out, where large, well-heeled corporate defendants can spend their opponents—employees, consumers,

14. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part); see Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Defense Lawyer’s “Different Mission”:
Reflections on the “Right” to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987).
15. SIMON, supra note 10, at 170-94; Subin, supra note 14; Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie
Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 689 (1988).
16. Pepper, supra note 5, at 622 (“In the criminal context the moral value of full access to all that the law allows is simply clearer and more dramatic.”).
17. See id. at 621 (“The critics [of neutral partisanship] suggest that a role justified by
the rather unusual context of the criminal justice system simply is not justified in the far
more common lawyer roles.”).
18. Lon Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism
and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669 (1978).
19. LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 64. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the
Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543.
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and even government agencies—into unfavorable settlement or outright defeat, despite the merits of their cases.20
This series of arguments cleared the field for the reformers’ second line of assault on the criminal defense paradigm.21 Having countered every effort of neutral partisans to expand the criminal defense
paradigm into other areas of law, critics then turned their analysis
on criminal defense itself. Several accepted elements of criminal defense lawyering, they have argued, are not always required, and
hence not universally justified, by the social policies that support the
criminal defense lawyer’s “different mission.” The policies typically
invoked are preventing the conviction of the innocent and protecting
the dignity interests—rights, if you prefer—of even the guilty.22 But
neither of these policies necessarily entails helping the known guilty
avoid conviction whenever they are prosecuted.23
At least in principle, these policies could be served as well by a
“friendly inquisitor” as by a “zealous advocate,” to use Edmundson’s
useful distinction. In his words,
[b]oth roles are designed to assure that no one is punished unless
on evidence that excludes reasonable possibilities of factual innocence. But the friendly inquisitor’s job is to assemble facts, and if
the facts exclude reasonable doubts about guilt, her remaining job
is to bring the offender to accept responsibility, not to make efforts
to help him avoid it. The zealous advocate, on the other hand,
brings a far stricter epistemic standard to the facts, and she operates throughout on the presumption (if not the belief) that responsibility cannot justly be assigned to the accused. It is this distinc-

20. Id. at 58-66; see also SIMON, supra note 10, at 53-76 (arguing against instrumentalist defenses of neutral partisanship).
21. We should note that not all the reformers have gone along. See David Luban, Are
Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993) (criticizing William Simon’s
critique of neutral partisanship in the context of criminal defense).
22. See SIMON, supra note 10, at 177 (“We can all agree on a system that provides
strong opportunities for the establishment of innocence and for the assertion of some intrinsic procedural rights.”).
23. Id. at 190; see also Subin, supra note 14; Murray Schwartz, On Making the True
Look False and the False Look True, 41 SW. L.J. 1135 (1988). The official position of the
ABA came close to that of the reformers on the point of discrediting truthful witnesses, but
only for a while. As Murray Schwartz pointed out:
The ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice suggests that a
lawyer’s knowledge that the witness is testifying truthfully “may affect the
method and scope of cross-examination or impeachment,” STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 7.6(b) at 132 (1974),
and the Commentary implies that the lawyer should not impeach a truthful witness (Approved Draft, at 272).
Schwartz, supra note 18, at 673 n.12. But that was 1974; the current version makes clear
that “[d]efense counsel’s belief or knowledge that the witness is telling the truth does not
preclude cross-examination.” STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-7.6(b) (1992).
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tive difference between the roles of the friendly inquisitor and the
zealous advocate that is in need of justification.24

That justification, as Edmundson points out, has traditionally
been instrumentalist. Unless the criminal defense lawyer acts as a
zealous advocate, not just a friendly inquisitor, the criminal justice
system cannot effectively guarantee the acquittal of the innocent and
the dignity-based rights of the guilty. What the reformers argue is
possible in principle, the neutral partisans deny is possible in fact.
But this, as Edmundson demonstrates, is not where the argument over the central issue in criminal defense work begins. That
beginning, back to which he effectively takes us, is the following syllogism:
Major premise: Knowingly to help another do harm or injustice
is, prima facie, to do harm or injustice oneself.
Minor premise: When criminal defense lawyers knowingly assist
the guilty in avoiding conviction, they knowingly assist in harm or
injustice.
Conclusion: Therefore, criminal defense lawyers, prima facie, do
harm or injustice themselves.

As Edmundson points out, both neutral partisans and their critics
accept the validity of this argument. They agree that assisting the
known guilty in avoiding conviction is a prima facie wrong; what
they disagree on is whether that prima facie wrong is justifiable.
Neutral partisans maintain that it is justifiable as a necessary
means to deeply shared values; their critics argue that it isn’t.
Thus all legal ethicists, neutral partisans as well as their critics,
have traditionally taken criminal defense as a special case of this
general principle. There has never been much question that knowingly assisting a criminal defendant in avoiding a just penalty for his
or her crime is prima facie a harm to the criminal’s victims, or an injustice to society, or a vice on your own part, or all of the above.25
Defenders of the criminal defense paradigm have, accordingly,
almost invariably proceeded to justify this prima facie wrong that
lies at the root of the prevailing conception of the criminal defense
lawyer’s role. As Edmundson points out, these defenses follow modern moral philosophy more generally along one of three routes. Either the consequences of the prima facie harm promise a preponderance of some social good, or the moral dignity of the criminal defendant trumps any such harm, or any such harms are part of social arrangements that self-interested individuals would assent to ab initio.
24. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 17.
25. Prof. Edmundson himself concedes that a harm occurs when the guilty are acquitted; as we shall see, he is at pains, not to deny the harm, but to absolve the guilty defendants’ lawyers of any culpability for that harm, even prima facie. Id. at 19.
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As we have seen, these defenses are, as it were, on the defensive,
under sustained assault from reformers. What Edmundson offers is a
radically new defense, in the nature of a counterattack. Edmundson
reminds us that the conclusion of our syllogism need not be taken for
granted; it can, in fact, be attacked at either of two obvious points,
the major premise or the minor.
The major premise, an obvious corollary of the “no harm” principle,26 may seem compelling and commonsensical to most of us, but it
is hardly unassailable. Some of Socrates’s more outré interlocutors
denied it, or came extremely close, in identifying justice with the will
of the strong: Thrasymachus in Book I of the Republic;27 Callicles in
the final round of the Gorgias.28 Nietzsche, in his more exultantly
blond-beastly, proto-Nazi moods, notoriously denounced it as close to
the root of all evil (or, as he put it, bad);29 Ayn Rand is a somewhat
less extreme, if much less eloquent, fellow-traveller.30 Theirs, not
surprisingly, is not the road Prof. Edmundson recommends.
He, instead, attacks the minor premise, the assumption that
criminal defense lawyers knowingly assist the guilty in avoiding conviction. Rather than concede that criminal defense lawyers need to
justify the prima facie wrong of knowingly assisting the guilty in
avoiding punishment, he denies that their assistance is “knowing,”
(the minor premise in our syllogism). Here lies the ingeniousness of
his approach; it opens a new front in the defense of the criminal defense paradigm. And it opens that front by marshalling a sophisticated philosophical argument that draws less from ethics, the standard resort of reformers, than from epistemology, a discipline they
invoke much less often. With respect to criminal defense lawyers,
Edmundson’s position is not a mere “forgive them, for they know not
what they do.” He argues that, if they don’t know what they’re doing,
then they do no moral wrong, prima facie or otherwise, even if what
they are doing works very grievous individual or social harm. Thus,
unlike earlier defenders of the criminal defense paradigm, he does
not merely tell us to lower our accusing fingers, now that a prima facie wrong has been explained away. Beyond that, he chides us, at
least implicitly, for ever having raised an accusation in the first
place.
What is more, Edmundson sweeps within his defense some of the
very practices that reformers have argued cannot be justified by the
26. On the “no harm” principle, generally, see 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS (1984).
27. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 15 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968)
28. PLATO, THE GORGIAS 77-80 (Walter Hamilton trans., 1960).
29. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 28-34 (Walter Kaufmann
& R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1969).
30. AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS (1964).
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standard instrumentalist defenses of the criminal defense lawyer’s
role. He explicitly defends presenting false defenses,31 “making the
false look true,” and his defense could easily be extended to “making
the true look false,” not only the general practice of discrediting
truthful witnesses, but also the particular practice of “brutal crossexamination” of complaining witnesses in rape cases.32
Perhaps most significantly, Edmundson’s argument could be extrapolated beyond the criminal defense paradigm to all other modes
of lawyering—not just civil contexts analogous to criminal trials, like
child custody cases, where the state threatens a single individual
with calamitous personal loss, but also the entire spectrum of corporate representation, from defending litigation brought by the government with respect to past actions to the most insulated in-office
counseling about proposed future courses of conduct. The exchange
between Boswell and Johnson on which he relies is certainly susceptible, on its face, to just such an expansive reading. What Johnson
defends, it is worth remembering, is not just criminal defense but,
more generally, “supporting a cause which you know to be bad.”33
To see how this extrapolation from Edmundson’s argument would
go, consider another syllogism, which starts where the first leaves
off. For neutral partisans and for Edmundson, though for different
reasons, criminal defense lawyers are not morally culpable for the
harms or injustice they assist in when they work to acquit the guilty.
This is where the second syllogism begins:
Major premise: Criminal defense lawyers are not morally culpable for the harms or injustice they assist in when they represent
their clients as zealously as the law allows, because of A (the traditional, instrumentalist reasons) or B (Edmundson’s epistemological reason).
Minor premise: Other lawyers (some or all) are like criminal defense lawyers in the representation of their clients, because of A
(the traditional reasons) or B (Edmundson’s reason).
Conclusion: Other lawyers (some or all) are not morally culpable
for the harms they assist in when they represent their clients as
zealously as the law allows.
31. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 18-19.
32. See David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellman, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1027-28 (1990) (detailing
elements of “brutal cross-examination”).
33. David Luban has convincingly shown why, as a general defense of neutral partisanship, the Johnsonian position cannot hold. LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 26-29.
The crux of his long and careful argument is nicely captured in this parodic reductio ad absurdum: “‘Imagine that!’ Dr. Johnson exclaims. ‘I was wrong about the weakness of our
case! My arguments turned out to be sound after all—for the judge relied on them in the
opinion!’” Id. at 29. In important ways, Luban’s argument against Johnson’s position anticipates Edmundson’s reliance on that position, though it cuts much more strongly as to
issues of law than issues of fact.
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As we have seen, neutral partisanship’s critics have long, and I
think persuasively, attacked this extrapolation in terms of the traditional, instrumentalist defenses of the criminal defense paradigm.
Whatever social goods the criminal defense paradigm may be plausibly said to be necessary to advance, it has been shown that the same
zealous representation is not necessary on the part of civil lawyers to
advance those goals. These critics have, in effect, shown that the minor premise in our second syllogism is false, or at least subject to
deep doubts, insofar as it relies on A, the traditional reasons for the
criminal defense paradigm, because those reasons do not apply to
other lawyers.
Notice, however, that Edmundson’s argument offers an alternative version of the minor premise, in terms of B, his epistemological
defense of the criminal defense paradigm. It is not too much to say
that, if Edmundson’s argument is sound, the entire decades-long debate between neutral partisans and their critics has been shifted
radically in favor of the former.
Edmundson himself, I hasten to underscore, does not attempt
these extrapolations; in all likelihood, he would lament them.34 His
case is, in its own terms, limited to the criminal defense paradigm.
But Prof. Edmunson’s defense of neutral partisanship in the context
of criminal defense, if successful, would, as our second syllogism
shows, apply to other contexts as well. If the history of that paradigm
is any indication, those extrapolations will be made. This, then, is the
context in which Edmundson makes his contextualist case; these are
the stakes in the game he invites us to play. In the next part, I will
try to show why Edmundson’s argument is fundamentally unsound,
why the reformers’ criticisms of neutral partisanship have lost none
of their purchase, in either the criminal defense paradigm or elsewhere.
II. ANALYSIS: WHY PROF. EDMUNDSON’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL
APPROACH CANNOT ANSWER THE BASIC QUESTION ABOUT THE
CRIMINAL DEFENSE PARADIGM
Edmundson candidly admits, at the outset, the apparent oddity
of denying that criminal defense lawyers know that their clients are
guilty. To account for that oddity, he reminds us of an important
epistemological point about the relationship between ordinary and
special claims of knowledge. We can, he points out, comfortably affirm that we know things that we can’t prove absolutely, where
“prove absolutely” means ruling out all imaginable possibilities of er34. So, I can now report, he has confirmed to me in our email correspondence. E-mail
from Professor William Edmundson to Professor Rob Atkinson (Aug. 14, 2002, 11:47 EST)
(on file with author).
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ror. We (well, most of us) believe that the universe is billions of years
old; yet, as Bertrand Russell famously pointed out, “there is no logical impossibility in the view that the world was created five minutes
ago, complete with memories and records.”35 Even more mundanely,
we know that the sun will come up tomorrow, as we (again, most of
us) know it has for billions of years. Yet, as David Hume pointed out,
the causal nexus between past and future is surprisingly difficult to
establish;36 as your stockbroker will tell you (more readily now than a
year ago), past performance is no guarantee of future earnings. As
Descartes pointed out, further back and more radically still, we can
doubt pretty much everything we experience—except, ironically, our
most immediate doubts.37
Major philosophical reputations have been made, in very different
times and places,38 by showing us how well we can get along without
absolute knowledge. Reasonable certainty serves us well enough, day
in and day out, as an entirely adequate substitute for absolute
knowledge; if we can’t rule out all imaginable sources of error, we can
readily enough rule out all relevant sources.
Similarly, ordinary language about knowledge serves us quite
adequately for ordinary life—or, more precisely, for most situations
in life. What we ordinarily mean when we say we know something is
that we have eliminated not all possible doubts, but all contextually
relevant doubts. Thus, when someone tells us that we don’t “really”
know what we think we know, we know that the asserted “really” is
in inverted commas and that the person making the assertion is a
philosopher, professional or amateur. If we begin to suspect that the
“really” really isn’t in inverted commas, then we also begin to suspect
that we are talking, not to a philosopher, but to a nut (assuming we
know our interlocutor to be older than nineteen and not one of our
own offspring).
The insight that reasonable belief is almost always enough carries
a corollary point, on which Edmundson relies more directly: In epistemological language, as in the law of torts and elsewhere, reasonableness varies with the circumstances. Sitting in a restaurant and
35. BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN OUTLINE OF PHILOSOPHY 7 (1960).
36. DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 72-89 (Charles
W. Hendel ed., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1955) (1748).
37. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD 20-21 (Laurence J. LaFleur trans., Liberal Arts Press 1950) (1637).
38. I’m thinking of Kant’s effort to answer Hume’s skepticism, see IMMANUEL KANT,
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., P.F. Collier 1901) (1787), and the
Ordinary Language Philosophers’ response to reductionists like Bertrand Russell. Illustrative of a very wide field are J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1975), and
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953).
Prof. Edmundson has reminded me that the American Pragmatists, particularly John
Dewey, are another case-in-point. See JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY (1930).
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asking the waiter for something to cut your meat with, you know
you’ll get a steak knife; if what you want is a microtome, you know
you’ll have to ask for it specifically. If you are in the cytology lab, on
the other hand, these expectations about cutlery will be reversed
(and, following linguistic conventions as old as the Norman Conquest, the mammalian muscle before you won’t be beef, pork, or mutton, but cattle, swine, or sheep). So it is with language more generally, including the language of knowledge. We know that what we
know—more precisely, what we need to know to claim we know—
varies with the situation. As the philosophers of linguist analysis are
wont to say, in their typically flippant way, we play lots of games39 or
do lots of things40 with words, and we typically know the rules and
the tools.
But some tasks require special tools, and, in life and in language,
we have to fashion what we don’t find in the literal or metaphorical
toolbox. Microbiologists need microtomes, not steak knives; as Katharine Ross told Paul Newman and Robert Redford in Butch Cassidy
and the Sundance Kid, “your line of work requires a specialized
vocabulary.”41 In that respect, at least, our epistemological enquiry is
like their bank robbing. To show how well we get along without
absolute knowledge, we need to be able to distinguish our everyday
sense of “knowing” from more restrictive and demanding senses. This
is not to say that our ordinary use of “know” is sloppy, much less
wrong, any more than we are wrong or sloppy to say, in a postCopernican world, that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west,
or to cut our meat at the table with a steak knife rather than a scalpel, or a microtome. What’s right—more precisely, what’s appropriate or reasonable—depends on the task at hand, be it verbal or culinary.
The meanings of words, then, like the functions of tools, are taskspecific.42 If we come up with a new task, we may need to find or create new tools. Where the task is a language-task, the new tools will
be new terms, or new meanings for old terms. From Edmundson’s
perspective, defending bank robbers, like bank robbery itself, can be
seen as just such a special task, requiring just such a specialized vocabulary. For that task, we may need, as we do in epistemology, a
special sense of the word “know.” In particular, he maintains that we

39. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 23, at 11e (“Here the term ‘language-game’ is
meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”).
40. AUSTIN, supra note 38.
41. BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE KID (20th Century Fox 1969).
42. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 11, at 6e (“Think of the tools in a tool-box: there
is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails, and screws.—The
functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.”).
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need a sense of “know” for criminal defense lawyers’ knowledge of
their clients’ crimes that is almost as restrictive as the deeply skeptical, gold-standard, “absolute knowledge” that epistemologists sometimes invoke. Edmundson calls this “film noir” skepticism. Before the
criminal defense lawyer can be said to know a client is guilty under
that standard, “the lawyer must rule out the possibility that by some
unfathomable whim of fate, a kaleidoscope of otherwise disjointed
appearances has frozen itself into a damning configuration.”43 This
standard, as Edmundson indicates, is analogous to, but even stricter
than, our criminal justice system’s high standard of proof for conviction, proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Under that latter, proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, we
could say that, for purposes of deciding whether a criminal defendant
is guilty, jurors do not “know” the defendant did what he or she had
done even though, in other contexts, they might “know” it well
enough. Thus the jurors in the O.J. Simpson trial could be said not to
“know,” for purposes of convicting him of murder, that O.J. killed his
ex-wife. But they probably “know” it well enough not to recommend
him for a blind date.
Notice two things about this example. First, we as a society have
discussed the Simpson trial, and many another criminal trial, long
and well without invoking any special sense of the word “know.” Why
didn’t the jury convict someone who seemed so obviously guilty? The
widely believed, but less than charitable answer, of course, was that
Johnny Cochran played the “race card.” The less cynical, if less plausible, answer was that, because of reasonable doubts about the evidence traceable to a suspiciously racist police department, the jury
found that the government had not proved its case “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
But what, many lay-folk wondered aloud, about the second trial,
in which a different jury found Mr. Simpson liable for the wrongful
death of his ex-wife? We lawyers explained (the more telegenic
among us on TV): In the later civil trial, with its lower, preponderance of the evidence standard, the jury was able to find Mr. Simpson
civilly liable for the very same alleged wrong. To make it an epistemological sound-bite, with “scare quotes” filling in for voiceinflections:
It’s a double standard. Even if the jurors in both cases “knew” Mr.
Simpson killed his ex-wife, the jurors in the first trial could find
the evidence insufficient for a criminal conviction, even though the
jurors in the second trial could find essentially the same evidence
adequate for civil liability.

43. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 7.
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We, lawyers and layfolk alike, can explain the different outcomes in
the civil and criminal Simpson cases, compare them, and criticize
them, all without invoking any special sense of the term “know.”
The second thing to note about the Simpson case is that we all
understand (or, if you will, know) why the jurors were required to use
a higher standard of proof, to be more skeptical, in the criminal case.
They had a very serious task before them: determining a fellow citizen’s guilt or innocence of a heinous act, to which we attach the most
severe of possible penalties, loss of liberty and even life. We as a society insist that, before we make that determination and attach those
penalties, we are very, very sure we are correct. To be as sure as we
reasonably can, we require our jurors to resolve all plausible doubts
in favor of the accused.
Another part of that assurance is to require that every criminal
defendant be represented by a lawyer, whose job it is to make sure
that the government meets that high standard of proof. How the
lawyer goes about that, of course, is a matter of much dispute, to
which we shall return shortly. But notice, for now, that, whatever the
particular requirements of that role, it has two general features in
common with the two we have just seen with respect to jurors. First,
we all understand (again, if you will, know) that it is defined as a
means to, and justified in terms of, our deep-seated insistence on protecting criminal defendants. Whatever special things the criminal defense lawyer has to do, we know the reason for their having to be
done. Second, we can discuss and explain those things, and the reasons for them, without invoking special standards of knowledge. In
particular, we don’t typically say, with Edmundson, that the criminal
defense lawyers treat clients differently from the way we treat them,
or from the way lawyers treat other clients, because they know less
about their clients than we do. Indeed, we typically suspect that,
unless criminal defense lawyers take special steps to preserve their
ignorance,44 they know a good deal more about their clients than we
do. That suspicion, of course, is at the root of our cocktail party question about criminal defense lawyers: How can they try to acquit those
they know to be guilty?
And that, as we saw at the outset, is the very question with which
Edmundson wrestles. He would have criminal defense lawyers give
44. The most famous, or infamous, is “the Lecture,” from ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY
MURDER 35-36 (1958). The lawyer silences the client, tells the client a range of possible defenses, and lets the client fill in the necessary facts; if the sequence is properly followed, the lawyer supposedly can’t “know” when the client is lying. Id. See also KENNETH
MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985) (describing “avoidance techniques,” ways developed by white collar criminal defense lawyers
“to avoid inquiry that protect them from potential accusations of unethical misconduct by
others and from a personal feeling of ethical impropriety that would make it difficult to
perform their work”).
OF A
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an answer that is, to them and to us, very odd: “Because we criminal
defense lawyers don’t know our clients are guilty.” In response, it
makes perfect sense for us to ask, “What do you mean, you don’t
know?” We know either that they are being defensive to the point of
disingenuousness or that they are invoking a very special sense of
the word “know.” Edmundson would have us believe it is the latter;
more precisely, he wants us to substitute the latter for the former.
To appreciate fully the specialness of this criminal defense notion
of knowledge, consider, again, the two Simpson cases (the first criminal, the second civil). In the first, under our standard conception of
the criminal defense function, Simpson’s lawyers were permitted,
even expected, to put the state on its proof as to each aspect of its
case, even if those lawyers knew him to be guilty as charged. In the
parallel civil damages case, by contrast, matters stand quite differently. Under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct45 and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,46 lawyers representing civil defendants are forbidden to contest what they know to be true. If they
know there is no defense of their clients’ conduct other than denying
facts they know to be true, they must concede liability. They may assert affirmative defenses (the statute of limitations, for example),
and they may contest the amount of damages. But, in contrast to the
criminal case, they may not deny what they know their client did, in
an ordinary language sense of the word “know.”
Nor are criminal defense lawyers themselves wholly absolved of
ordinary standards of knowledge. For precisely this reason, as Edmundson himself concedes, the law of perjury is a particular puzzle
for his theory.47 As he notes, the ABA Model Rules forbid a lawyer,
even a criminal defense lawyer to “‘knowingly . . . fail to disclose a
material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client . . . [or] offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.’”48 If a lawyer knows that a
client or witness has offered perjured testimony, the lawyer must inform the tribunal; if the lawyer knows the client is about to testify
falsely, the lawyer must forbid it. How can these requirements apply

45. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (1999). California’s parallel provisions,
which would have governed the Simpson case, are admittedly less clear on this point. See
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5-200(A), (B) (1988) (requiring lawyers to employ “such means only as are consistent with truth” and forbidding them to “seek to mislead the judge, judicial officer, or jury by an artifice or false statement of fact or law”).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
47. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 7-8.
48. Id. at 7 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1999)). See also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) (clarifying, in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nix v. Whiteside, that this rule applies with full
force to criminal defense counsel).
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to criminal defense lawyers, if, on Edmundson’s hypothesis, they
cannot know when their clients are guilty of perjury?
Here is Edmundson’s answer: “Knowledge of the underlying offense simply does not enter into the lawyer’s duty to report client or
witness perjury. What the lawyer ‘knows’ is the existence of an
irreconcilably inconsistent prior account; it is unnecessary to suppose
in addition that the lawyer knows which (if either) is the true account.”49 But that knowledge is precisely what the law of perjury does
suppose, as the pre-condition of the lawyer’s duty to report. Otherwise, Edmundson’s argument proves far too much, and the lawyer
would have to report far more than current law requires.
Consider the facts in Nix v. Whiteside,50 the case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a state’s requirement that criminal defense lawyers report client perjury. In that
case, the criminal defense lawyer suspected perjury when, a week before trial, his client added a new and exculpatory detail to his selfdefense story: On the fateful night when he admittedly committed
homicide, he had seen something “metallic” in his victim’s hand.
Here we have Edmundson’s two inconsistent stories, the earlier one
with “something metallic” in the victim’s hand, the later one without.
What’s the lawyer to do?
Virtually all authorities, even the severest critics of a requirement
to report perjury,51 agree that the first step is to confront the client
with the inconsistency. If the two stories really can’t be reconciled,
then the lawyer must do what Edmundson says the lawyer needn’t
do: decide which story is really true. This is precisely what the lawyer in Nix v. Whiteside did. He asked his client why, at so late a date
and on so important a point, he suddenly referred to having seen
“something metallic.” Here is his client’s fatefully candid reply: “[I]n
Howard Cook’s case there was a gun. If I don’t say I saw a gun, I’m
dead.”52 Having heard this attempted reconciliation, the lawyer found
the “something metallic” story incredible. He concluded that his client had added the detail, not because he remembered it belatedly,
but because he thought he needed to improve his story with false,
self-serving elaboration. The lawyer further concluded that, because
he knew his client was about to offer perjured testimony, he could
not let him take the stand to present that testimony—a conclusion

49.
50.
51.
52.

Edmundson, supra note 2, at 8.
475 U.S. 157 (1986).
FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 120.
Nix, 475 U.S. at 161.
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which the United States Supreme Court held not to violate the client’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.53
Had the client convinced his lawyer that he really had remembered, rather than invented, the “glint of metal”—a possibility that
Justice Stevens emphasized in a concurring opinion54—the lawyer
would have had no duty to report the inconsistency in the stories. Indeed, under current law, the lawyer would be not only forbidden to
reveal the inconsistency, but also required to let the client take the
stand to present the story, including the supplemental detail about
seeing the glint of metal.55 To know which set of obligations bound
him—to refuse to allow his client to put in the false testimony, or to
allow him to put in the true—the lawyer must, contrary to Edmundson’s claim, know which story is true and which, false. It cannot be
enough simply to know that the two are irreconcilable. Otherwise,
criminal defense lawyers would have to report not just the changed
stories they find incredible, but all inconsistent stories, which is
clearly more than current law requires or even permits.
There is, I should point out, a way out of this perjury puzzle that
is entirely consistent with Edmundson’s position. We can simply say
that, for purposes of determining whether a criminal defendant is
committing perjury, as for determining whether a civil defendant has
a contestable case, ordinary standards of knowledge apply. What this
underscores is precisely my point: Edmundson’s claim that criminal
defense lawyers cannot know of their clients’ guilt is a very special,
and peculiar, sense of the word “know.”
This is Edmundson’s critical move; we must look at this peculiar
sense of “know” very closely, even (if you will) skeptically. The standard answer to “how can you assist those you know to be guilty in
avoiding conviction” is closely parallel to the answer we saw with respect to jurors, in both form and content. In form, the answer invokes
the systemic need to protect criminal defendants; criminal defense
lawyers work to acquit the guilty because that is what it takes to
protect criminal defendants. In substance, the lawyer’s standard answer is closely related to the jury’s “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard: In order to insure that we convict only under that stan53. But, as Prof. Edmundson’s patron sage pointed out, “when any man knows he is to
be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.” 2 JAMES BOSWELL, THE
LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 393 (1963).
54. Id. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring):
A lawyer’s certainty that a change in his client’s recollection is a harbinger of
intended perjury—as well as judicial review of such apparent certainty—should
be tempered by the realization that, after reflection, the most honest witness
may recall (or sincerely believe he recalls) details that he previously overlooked.
55. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (affirming criminal defendants’ right to
testify).
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dard, lawyers have to do what, in some cases, involves helping those
they know to be guilty to avoid conviction.
One way of describing what lawyers do for criminal defendants
would be to say that they treat them as if they do not know that they
are in fact guilty, even when they do know. That is close to the answer Edmundson would have criminal defense lawyers give: “We
don’t know our clients are guilty.” Seen against that background,
and understood that way, Edmundson’s answer looks a lot less peculiar. In response to it, we might say, “Oh, we see, you’re not saying
that you don’t know that they are guilty, in the ordinary sense of
‘know’; what you’re saying is that you’re just acting as if you didn’t
know it, the way jurors do, though even more aggressively than
they.”
But that raises an immediate and obvious question: Since you can
explain what criminal defense lawyers do for their clients without
invoking a special sense of “know,” why invoke it? Here, I believe, is
where Edmundson’s argument gets into trouble. He gives two reasons, neither of which works as well as he wants. The first, and most
basic, reason is to avoid having to justify the criminal defense lawyer’s role in the usual ways (consequentialist, dignity-based, or contractarian). And the second is like unto it: to give criminal defense
lawyers “breathing space” in which to formulate those very justifications. Neither works, I’m afraid, for pretty much the same reason, as
we shall see.
With respect to the first, Edmundson’s own odd way of defending
criminal defense in terms of a special sense of knowledge ultimately
brings us back to the very standard defenses, in terms of consequences, rights, or hypothetical contracts, that he hopes to avoid. As
we have seen, special senses of knowledge-terms, like special senses
of other terms and special uses for other tools, are quite common, and
the special contexts in which they occur are readily identifiable. But
sometimes those contexts need more than identification; sometimes
they need justification as well. As Edmundson himself admits, “[a]
justification has to be given for the social practices that support the
creation of special epistemic contexts, especially ones that attach to
socially created and sanctioned roles, such as lawyer and juror.”56 In
other words, if he is to have criminal defense lawyers claim not to
know that their clients are guilty, he must justify that strikingly
narrow standard of knowledge. Edmundson, again, admits as much:
“[A] justification is demanded of the social institution—call it the adversary system—which assigns an especially rigorous epistemic
standard to criminal-defense attorneys.”57
56. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 6.
57. Id. at 16.
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The demand for that justification, curiously, carries us back to
ground familiar to all scholars of legal ethics generally and criminal
defense particularly. As Edmundson puts it:
Any type of criminal justice system has to be justified, and the
candidate types of justification emphasize one or more of the following: the social consequences of adopting one or another type of
system; the extent to which one or another system respects human
dignity; and the extent to which one, rather than another, system
would be eligible as an object of reasonable agreement among selfinterested individuals.58

And our own adversarial system, as he points out, has a distinctive
element to justify in one of those three ways. We must explain why
lawyers operate under not just a high, beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, but, beyond that, under a “super-exacting,” film noir standard. That, as we have seen, is simply Edmundson’s way of rephrasing an old and familiar aspect of our system: the criminal defense lawyer’s knowingly assisting the guilty in avoiding conviction.
But, if we have to defend that aspect of the criminal defense lawyer’s
role in the same terms in which it has always been defended, where
has Edmundson’s argument gotten us?
His answer at this point is doubly surprising, and, I have to say,
doubly disappointing—surprising and disappointing both in what he
admits he hasn’t given us, and in what he claims he has given us. He
does not claim to have added anything to the standard defenses of
the more troubling aspects of the criminal defense lawyer’s role; indeed, after reviewing them, he finds what he takes to be the best of
them wanting.59
What, then, does he claim to have given us? In a word, help, in the
form of the best available experts to assist us in examining the normative (as opposed to linguistic) justifications of the criminal defense
lawyer’s role. These experts, he tells us, are none other than criminal
defense lawyers themselves. “It is they who are the learned professionals in most frequent sympathetic contact with people accused of
crime.”60 “In the absence of systematic empirical study, . . . their anecdotal wisdom may be the best we can get” as the basis for evaluating our current version of the criminal defense lawyer’s role.61
Presumably we are to settle for this admittedly second best source
because “systematic empirical study” is not to be forthcoming. But
there is still a puzzle here. What exactly has Edmundson done to
58. Id.
59. Id. at 18. Of the argument that he takes as the linch-pin of the adversarial system
defense, Edmundson says “it has a certain plausibility, but may be less than compelling.”
Id. at 21.
60. Id. at 21.
61. Id.
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enlist these supposed experts in aid of our inquiry? One would think
that they would be eagerly engaged in that inquiry already; it is, after all, their role that is being questioned. That, Edmundson says, is
precisely the problem: “They are . . . not inclined toward dispassionate evaluation, largely, I would hazard to say, because they have
been too willing to accept the popular view of themselves as persons
regularly engaged in knowingly helping the guilty to avoid just punishment.”62 Locked in a siege mentality by questions about the moral
justifiability of their role, particularly the aspect that involves knowingly assisting the guilty in avoiding conviction, criminal defense
lawyers have hunkered down behind what Edmundson sees as a patently unsound justification of their position, what he calls “an arid
anti-state ideology.”63 Edmundson hopes that they will divorce that
“bad ideology” now that he has absolved them of the charge of prima
facie wrong-doing that drove them into its arms in the first place.64
But how has he removed that charge, if what criminal defense
lawyers need to answer that charge, a justification of the criminal defense system, is precisely what he is liberating them to help us find?
The key that is to release them from their bad ideology seems to be
exactly the key to the “good ideology” that everyone, we as well as
they, are looking for. To put it most pointedly, hasn’t Edmundson assumed his conclusion, leading us in a circular argument, and a very
wide one at that?
He recognizes this implicit charge, and offers an ingenious, but ultimately unsatisfying answer—an answer, I’m afraid, that turns out
to be another iteration of the same circle, a wheel within a wheel. At
two critical points in his paper, Edmundson distinguishes the need to
justify the criminal justice system, on the one hand, from the need to
explain apparently prima facie wrong-doing on the part of criminal
defense lawyers within that system, on the other.65 This is not, to be
sure, a distinction without a difference. Unfortunately for this critical
aspect of Edmundson’s argument, however, it is a difference that
compounds, rather than corrects, the circularity problem.
Let us concede, quite willingly, the distinction Edmundson draws
between justifying individual, role-required acts, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, the systems that require those roles and acts.
As David Luban and others have nicely demonstrated, the need for
62. Id. See also id. at 16:
It is a regrettable fact that many criminal-defense attorneys bring the same zeal
they exercise on behalf of their clients to the defense of the adversary system.
Were this misplaced zeal relaxed, criminal-defense attorneys might be able to
join the rest of us in cooly examining the justification of the adversary system.
63. Id. at 22. See also SIMON, supra note 10, at 173-79 (dismissing the “bogey of the
state” as “driven by what might be called the Libertarian dogma”).
64. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 22.
65. Id. at 15-16, 21.
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defenses of role-specific moralities typically begin with the perception
that someone is doing, as part of a socially defined role, what would
appear to be improper outside that role.66 Thus, to take the example
at hand, criminal defense lawyers are making heroic efforts to acquit
those whom they know to be guilty; anyone else, working toward that
end, would be morally culpable of aiding injustice and perhaps legally culpable of obstruction of justice.
Having identified this prima facie conflict between role morality
and ordinary morality, analysis then turns to reducing the two to a
common denominator. The prima facie wrongful act (working to acquit the known guilty) is shown to be required by, and essential to, a
social role, such as that of criminal defense lawyer. That role is then
shown to be required by a particular social institution; in our example, the adversarial system of justice. And that system, finally, is
shown to be critical to advancing certain values that are, themselves,
shared by ordinary morality. Thus, as we have seen, the criminal justice system is said to protect either the innocent from wrongful conviction, or the guilty themselves from dehumanizing indignities.
What seems to violate ordinary morality in the short run and at the
level of individual defense lawyers, their helping acquit the known
guilty, is thus justified, if it is justifiable at all, in terms of its systematically advancing the shared values of ordinary morality in the
longer run.
Broken down this way, the justification of particular prima facie
bad acts is clearly distinguishable from the justification of the system
in which those bad acts occur. This is just what Edmundson says.
But notice how, in the very mode of analysis Edmundson seems to
accept, the justification of the suspicious act stands or falls with justification of the system. If the prima facie bad act is justified, it is
only justified because it is required by a system that is itself justified.
It is this justificatory linkage that Edmundson attempts, I think
without success, to break. He would have the criminal defense lawyers deny moral responsibility for assisting those whom they know to
be guilty to avoid punishment, pending proof that the system in
which they render this assistance is itself morally justified (and, beyond that, also requires this particular sort of act).
But, unfortunately for Edmundson’s analysis, the two defenses
stand or fall together. Think of it this way: You know that the foundation of the building you’re now reading in is distinct from the room
in which you’re sitting; the foundation’s down there, and you’re up
66. My account of the structure of role morality follows LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra
note 5, at 128-47 (Chapter 7, “The Structure of Role Morality”). See also MICHAEL D.
BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 18-19 (2d ed. 1989) (describing a similarly-tiered justification system).
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here. But you also know that, if the foundation is not structurally
sound, the position you’re in is, to precisely that extent, precarious.
So it is with the morally dubious acts criminal defense lawyers do
without grounding them in a well-justified adversarial system. Without the justification of the system, the act itself remains unjustified,
and prima facie moral wrongs remain, prima facie, morally wrong.
At this point Edmundson wants to interpose his special knowledge
definition; he wants to tell the criminal defense lawyer that he or she
doesn’t “really” know that he or she is helping the guilty escape conviction. But, as we have seen, this linguistic more itself requires justification by reference to the adversarial system in a way that, we
can now see, is precisely parallel to the standard analysis of role morality. Edmundson’s highly restrictive use of the word “know,” like
the defense lawyer’s conduct to which it applies, requires justification. And the justification for creating that particular social context
is, precisely, its function in either protecting the dignity of the guilty
or preventing the conviction of the innocent. But that is none other
than the standard defense of the adversarial system.
It seems we are back, quite simply, where we began. We know
that assisting the guilty in avoiding conviction is prima facie wrong,
and we don’t know anything new about the adversarial system that
would justify that apparent wrong. I will suggest in Part III that we
are not quite back where we were, if only because the difficulty of
Edmundson’s heroically creative effort shows us the more general
difficulty of the task at hand. Before turning to that point, though, I
want to take a look at what we might call the psychological, as opposed to the logical, side of Edmundson’s argument.
As we have seen, Edmundson tells us, quite candidly and I think
quite appropriately and helpfully,67 why he offers us his epistemological defense of criminal defense lawyers: to free them to assist us
in undertaking a policy-based re-evaluation of the criminal defense
paradigm. Laudable though this purpose is, I fear that in undertaking it Edmundson is overly optimistic in two related ways. These are
two sides of the same psychological coin. He deals explicitly, but I
think too sanguinely, with the psychological state of conscientious
criminal defense lawyers; he omits entirely their opposite number,
criminal defense lawyers who are hopelessly unscrupulous.
To take the conscientious first, Edmundson believes that he can
relieve their anxiety about prima facie wrong-doing by showing them
that, seen in the proper light or described in the proper way, what
they are doing is not “really” wrong. He shows them and us how
67. See SIMON, supra note 10, at 18 (explaining that he grounds his critique of neutral
partisanship in jurisprudence rather than ethics, the spirit of the law instead of ordinary
morality, because reliance on the latter places lawyers at a psychological disadvantage).
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criminal defense lawyers could, in their off-duty, ordinary language
hours, know that they are working to acquit the guilty even though,
in their day-jobs, they don’t “really” know it, in the sense that they
are role-required to work as if they didn’t know it.68 As a matter of
logic and linguistics, Edmundson may well be right.
But I suspect that, as a matter of psychology, he is missing something quite important, a distinction quite well supported by both theory and at least anecdotal evidence. What he is missing is the distinction between knowing that a prima facie wrong is morally justified and being able to commit that sort of wrong over and over again
without deep psychological damage. As Bernard Williams has nicely
demonstrated,69 one can be intellectually convinced that role-required
acts are justified and yet still retain a strong moral disposition
against doing them. Soldiers can find killing, even in what they believe to be just wars, deeply distasteful, even unbearable; lawyers
may find making the false look true, and the true false, psychologically painful, 70 even if morally justified.71
It will be helpful here to refer you to two real-life examples. In the
first, Randy Bellows, formerly a staff attorney at the Washington,
D.C. Public Defender’s Office, describes how, over the course of several years, he found his defense of people he knew to be guilty of heinous crimes personally unbearable. In the second, Fred Armani, a
middle-aged, small-firm general practitioner in Syracuse, New York,
recounts in a series of videotaped interviews with journalist Fred
Graham his anguish in representing serial murderer Robert Garrow.72 For both cases, my summary is woefully inadequate. To fully
appreciate the lawyers’ pain, you really need to read Bellow’s graphic
depiction of his client’s crimes and the heart-rending decline of his
personal life, particularly his marriage;73 you need literally to see the
anguish in Armani’s face as he recounts to Graham how he refused to
tell the parents of his client’s victims where their bodies lay—one in

68. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 8-9.
69. Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, in THE GOOD
LAWYER, supra note 5, at 259.
70. Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public Defender, in THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF
LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 69 (Philip B. Heymann & Lance Liebman eds., 1991).
71. As Randy Bellows put it, in describing his cross examination of a police officer in a
criminal trial:
I did what I had to do. I did not regret it then and I do not regret it today. But I
had tried to make an honorable man appear dishonorable. And that is a sad thing
to have to do, even if you are a public defender and even if that is your job.
Id. at 71.
72. Videotape: Ethics on Trial (Jim Wesley 1987) (on file with the Florida State University Law Library) [hereinafter Ethics on Trial]. See also TOM ALIBRANDI & FRANK H.
ARMANI, PRIVILEGED INFORMATION (1984).
73. Bellows, supra note 70, at 69-70.
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an abandoned mineshaft, the other in a shallow grave outside a
cemetery.74
For our present purposes, however, the point is clear enough: Both
Bellows and Armani explicitly believed that what they had been doing—in both cases, trying to acquit those they knew to be guilty—
was completely justified, even required, by the Constitution itself.
Even so, it was almost more than they could bear. It is hard to see
how the comfort Edmundson offers lawyers like these, the prospect of
someday finding a full justification for what they are doing now,
could work any better than the full justification they firmly believed
they already have.
There is another side to this psychological coin. If the examples of
Bellows and Armani are any indication, at least some criminal defense lawyers will find no solace even in a more thorough defense of
their prima facie wrong-doing than Edmundson purports to offer.
But, if Williams’s dispositional theory is any indication, others may
need no such solace. They will have inured themselves to the very
real harm they know they do; they will have adapted in either of two
ways. On the one hand, they will have specifically adapted; they will
have come to feel no compunction about the harms they do in their
professional capacities. They will feel no more compunction about
putting an ax murderer back on the street than a surgeon feels about
making an incision in a chest. On the other hand—and, for Williams,
more worrisomely—they may change their general dispositions, what
he calls general adaptation. They won’t feel any compunction about
making the false look true and the true, false in their lawyerly lives,
because they don’t feel any compunction about such things anywhere
else in life.
This raises a possibility—for my money, a very safe bet—that
Edmundson, perhaps in an excess of charity, overlooks: Some criminal defense lawyers may not be very admirable people. They may not
need the moral comfort that Edmundson proffers, much less engage
with us in the moral inquiry he anticipates, because they may have
no compunction about what they do.75 And they may have no compunction about what they do, not because they believe it to be morally justified, but because they are wholly unconcerned with moral
justification. I hope you won’t think it overly cynical of me to suspect
that, just as some soldiers are sadists, so some lawyers are mercenaries. They may mouth the platitude that every criminal defendant,
however empty his purse or heinous his crime, deserves a lawyer.
74. Ethics on Trial, supra note 72.
75. See Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry,
36 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 672, 704-08 (2002) (noting and trying to account for and respond to
the presence of “felons, whores, and jerks” within the legal profession).
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But don’t expect to learn that, though many of their clients have
committed heinous crimes, few can’t afford heavy fees. What distinguishes these lawyers from their criminal clients is not the social
benefit of their practices, much less the loftiness of their motives, but
the barest legality of their deprepations.
III. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE ON
THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE PROBLEM
To say, as I have said at some length, that Edmundson’s theory
doesn’t work as intended is not to say that his effort has been fruitless. At very least, his theory nicely illustrates the wisdom of prefering a fertile error over a sterile truth.76 To shift to a more mundane
metaphor, Edmundson’s effort to sweep around the flanks of the present debate between neutral partisans and their critics may confirm
that the contest between them is joined at more or less the right
point. If that is so, then the burden of moral proof remains where the
current generation of legal ethics scholarship has placed it: squarely
on the defenders of neutral partisanship, to show why the prima facie wrongs lawyers do are not ultimately wrong, as much in zealously
assisting in the acquittal of guilty criminal defendants as in socially
harmful civil representations.
But, if I am right, Edmundson’s theory fails, not only at these
edges, but also in the center. His argument works no better for the
core of the criminal defense paradigm, merely getting the guilty off
by putting the state to its proof, than it does for the periphery, getting the guilty off by presenting false defenses and discrediting truthful witnesses. That, too, is significant. On the need for the former
kind of criminal defense, everyone, reformers and neutral partisans
alike, is in agreement. But, as Edmundson rightly points out, the
best contemporary defenses, in terms of preventing the conviction of
the innocent and protecting the rights of the guilty, leave us deeply
dissatisfied. As he says, they “excuse[] the lawyer’s conduct, but need
not relieve her guilty conscience.”77
When a necessary social role proves deeply disquieting, even
damaging, to conscientious people who fill that role, something is
radically wrong. Edmundson’s piece poignantly reminds us that this
is true of criminal defense work, and thus pointedly raises a basic
question: What are we to do? Problems with Edmundson’s argument,
despite its cleverness, lead me to suspect that one avenue is closed: If
there were a way to solve the problem in theory, Edmundson or his
76. See Hugh Trevor-Roper, History: Professional and Lay, in HISTORY &
IMAGINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.R. TREVOR-ROPER 1, 13 (Hugh Lloyd-Jones et al.
eds., 1981).
77. Edmundson, supra note 2, at 5.
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predecessors would have found it. I am convinced that, in effect, they
have proven a negative: There is no way to have our cake and eat it,
too, no way both to warrant the current model of criminal defense
work and to guarantee that those who do that kind of work will, at
the end of their long day, sleep perfectly well through the night. Seen
from this perspective, Edmundson’s epistemological argument is not
so much a circle, assuming the justification he is seeking, as a tightening of the screws, forcing us to face deep problems with the position we all share.
Edmundson reminds us that all civilized societies face the same
basic dilemma. On the one hand, some citizens do extraordinarily
anti-social things, including killing their fellow citizens, and some
cover their tracks and their transgressions in extremely artful ways.
On the other hand, wholly innocent people will occasionally find
themselves in deeply incriminating circumstances, often through no
fault of their own, and sometimes through the machinations of their
most anti-social compatriots.78 Society must protect itself from the
former,79 always at risk of confusing them with the latter. And errors
in either direction are costly: the danger of erroneous exculpation on
the one hand, the horror of erroneous conviction on the other. We
know, beyond a peradventure of a doubt, that innocent people have
been convicted, even executed; we know, equally well, that killers
(not to mention rapists and child molesters) notoriously kill (and
rape and molest) again. Dilemma dissolves into paradox: We desperately need to know precisely what, quite often, we cannot know; we
must act decisively, but we dare not.
Our resolution is a motto—better a hundred guilty go free than
one innocent suffer80—a motto both Edmundson and I wholeheartedly endorse. But that motto all too often degenerates into a
state of mind akin to both the just world self-delusion and the ostrich
syndrome.81 It is unthinkable that the innocent should be convicted,
so we don’t think about it; innocents shall not suffer, therefore we
cannot see that they do suffer. We worry over the excesses of zeal on
the part of criminal defense lawyers, while barely 10% of our crimi-

78. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969,
1970 (1992) (“Innocent persons are accused not because prosecutors are wicked but because these innocents appear to be guilty.”).
79. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 5
(1978) (“[S]ociety cannot long tolerate a legal system that lacks the capacity to convict unrepentant persons who commit clandestine crimes . . . .”).
80. See LAWYERS & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 58 (“Better, we say, that a hundred
criminals go free than that one person be wrongly convicted.”).
81. See id. at 59 n.17 (“The real objection to ‘Better a hundred criminals go free’ is not
that it is a middle class bromide, but rather that the middle class is so willing to abandon
it the moment that a suspected mugger or burglar enters the docket.”).
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nal cases actually go to trial.82 Plea bargains, the routine resolution
of the vast bulk of our criminal cases, are routinely forbidden in virtually all of our sibling democracies,83 which look with even deeper
dismay at our death penalty.84 And our prison population, particularly our death row population, is predominantly poor and overwhelmingly Black.85
All societies face an ultimately irreducible dilemma: separating
the wolves from the sheep, in a world where wolves not only kill
sheep, but also wear their clothing. It is hard to imagine how that
problem can ever be made fully to disappear. But our society has long
confronted a very different set of problems, which compound and
complicate that basic dilemma. We have good reason to suspect that
the hundred guilty whom we free are disproportionately wealthy and
white, while the innocent ones whom we send to prison and to death
are predominantly poor and Black.86
82. According to recent statistics, fewer than 10% of state felony cases and fewer than
15% of all federal cases. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN
NCJ-173939, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS 1996 7-8 (1999); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, OFFICE OF HUMAN RES. & STATISTICS, STATISTICS DIV., STATISTICAL TABLES
FED.
JUDICIARY
Table
D-4
(2001),
available
at
FOR
THE
http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2001/dectables/d04dec01.pdf (on file with author).
83. See Langbein, supra note 79, at 21 (“The contemporary nonadversarial criminal
justice systems of countries like West Germany have long demonstrated that advanced industrial societies can institute efficient criminal procedures that nevertheless provide for
lay participation and for full adjudication in every case of serious crime.”); see also id. at 3
(“My thesis is that there are remarkable parallels in origin, in function, and even in specific points of doctrine, between the law of torture and the law of plea bargaining.”); Rudolf
B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience,
26 BUFF. L. REV. 361, 382 (1977) (“[A]lthough the continental systems do not recognize a
plea of guilty, so that no defendant can be convicted or sentenced without an actual trial,
most criminal cases are handled with surprising dispatch.”). Not everyone, it should be
noted, opposes plea-bargaining. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 78, at 1975 (“Plea bargains are preferable to mandatory litigation . . . because compromise is better than conflict.”). For a succinct if now somewhat dated review of the literature for and against, see
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1909 n.4 (1992).
84. See SWEDISH PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, EUROPEAN UNION POLICY ON
DEATH
PENALTY
(2001),
available
at
THE
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/Demarche10May.htm (“The European Union is deeply concerned about the high number of executions in the United States.”) (on file
with author).
85. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN NCJ-195189,
PRISONERS IN 2001 11-12 (2002). More precisely, in 2001, 46.3% of the total state and federal inmate population was Black, compared to 36.1% white and 15.6% Hispanic. Id. at 11.
Even more stark are comparative incarceration rates: Fully 10% of Black males between
twenty-five and twenty-nine are in prison; the rate for whites is just over 1%. Id. at 12.
“[36%] of all inmates were not employed during the month before they were arrested for
their current offense.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS STATISTICS (2002), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm. Curiously, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics does not seem to maintain statistics on inmate income levels or
other more direct indices of economic or social class.
86. “Poor people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who lack the
skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters.” Stephen B. Bright,
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We, with Edmundson, understandably want to give aid and comfort to the lawyers for the latter.87 We would do well to remember,
however, that lawyers for the former may deserve something very
different. What’s fair for the goose may be fair for the gander, but it
doesn’t follow that justice requires identical treatment of shepherds
and serpents, watchdogs and wolverines. We know that zeal for the
good and zeal for the bad are both zeal; we also have reason to believe that one is good and the other, bad.
We all know that criminal defense lawyers sometimes work very
grievous social harms. In terms as old as Plato’s dialogues, they
sometimes make the false look true and the true, false; in phrases as
fresh as today’s headlines, they help put dangerous sociopaths back
on the street. Yet some criminal defense lawyers, I’m happy to say,
rank with the holiest of secular saints. They live and work among society’s morally worst, and economically worst off, assisting them out
of the sincerest conviction in ways that place the maximum imaginable stress on their own social, psychological, and moral well-being,
all for a fraction of the money they might make in other employment.
Their work cannot await either perfect justifications for what they
have to do, or progressive reforms of the system in which they have
to do it; their hesitation would literally mean others’ deaths, even innocent others’ deaths, at hands that are ultimately our own.
Other criminal defense lawyers, I’m only somewhat less comfortable in saying, are among the crassest of mercenaries, moral if not
legal criminals themselves. They represent the dangerous and depraved—drug kingpins and corporate defrauders, millionaire murderers and well-connected con-artists, socially secure date rapists
and drunk drivers—all with apparent indifference to both public injustice and private suffering. Some of them, no doubt, are conveniently self-deceived; they really believe, in some distorted way, in the
demonstrably dubious defenses of what they do. But most of them, I
suspect, simply don’t care. What we mustn’t forget is what they all
have in common: they make a lot of money helping the evil and
harming the innocent. Even if love of money were not the root of all
evil, large incomes would seldom be the stamp of disinterest as to
their source. Even if it’s not the solution to all mysteries, moral and

Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer,
103 Yale L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994).
87. William Simon has gone a long way in that direction, suggesting that what he
calls “[a]ggressive defense should be limited only to those cases that present a threat of excessive or arbitrary punishment and should be employed only to the extent it is likely to
counter the threat.” SIMON, supra note 10, at 190. This approach, he plausibly argues,
“would enable defense lawyers to connect their most plausible commitments more directly
to their everyday practices.” Id. at 194.
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political, Deep Throat’s admonition is helpful, here as elsewhere: Follow the money.
In philosophy, both moral and linguistic, we have all the refinements we need to know the difference between the saints and the
sinners, the shepherds and the wolves. But in law and in legal ethics,
our world is less tidy, and our task more challenging. We need a
great deal more work to square the demands of our criminal justice
system with those of our ordinary moral commitments. And we need
a great deal more work to make criminal defense itself less demanding of moral heroism on the one hand and less rewarding to moral
mercenarism on the other. Most of all, we need a great deal more
work toward a world where injustice does not breed poverty, and
poverty, crime. To believe that Prof. Edmundson’s ambitious and excellent article does not finish these tasks is certainly not to doubt
that he has worked at them wisely and well.
Thanks again, Bill.88

88. See supra note 3.

